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PSYCHOTHERAPIST-PATIENT
PRIVILEGE UNDER FEDERAL RULE
OF EVIDENCE 501
I.

INTRODUCTION

Federal Rule of Evidence 501 establishes a general privilege for
confidential communications in federal criminal proceedings.' Rule 501
evidences Congress' acknowledgment of "the authority of the federal
courts to continue the evolutionary development of testimonial privileges in federal criminal trials 'governed by the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted . . . in the light of reason and

experience.' ",2
Congress chose to adopt Rule 501, a general privilege, rather than
nine specific privilege rules defined in the Supreme Court's Proposed
Federal Rules of Evidence 502 to 510.3 Congress enacted a general,
i FED. R. EvID. 501. Rule 501 provides:
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States or provided
by. Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory
authority, the privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or political subdivision
thereof shall be governed by the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of reason and experience. However,
in civil actions and proceedings, with respect to an element of a claim or defense as to
which State law supplies the rule of decision, the privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or political subdivision thereof shall be determined in accordance with State
law.
Id.
In civil actions that involve "an element of a claim or defense as to which State law
supplies the rule of decision," state privilege law applies because no overriding federal interest
exists to outweigh enforcing state policy. Rule 501, however, mandates the application of
federal, rather than state, privilege law in criminal and non-diversity civil cases brought in
federal court because courts are enforcing federal law in these cases. Congress based Rule 501
on the rationale that federal law should not supersede state law in a substantive area such as
privileges without a compelling reason. United States v. Gillock, 445 U.S. 360, 369 (1980)
(citing H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1597, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 7-8 (1974)). See also S. REP. No. 1277,
93d Cong., 2d Sess. 11-13 (1974).
This Comment will discuss the application of Federal Rule of Evidence 501 only to criminal cases.
2 Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 47 (1980) (application of Rule 501 to husbandwife privilege).
3 H.R. Doc. No. 46, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 9-19 (1973). The Court's Proposed Federal
Rules of Evidence included privileges for required reports privileged by statute, PROPOSED
FED. R. EvID. 502, 56 F.R.D. 183, 234-35 (1972); attorney-client communications, PROPOSED
FED. R. EvID. 503, 56 F.R.D. at 235-37; psychotherapist-patient communications, PROPOSED
FED. R. EVID. 504, 56 F.R.D. at 240-41; husband-wife communications, PROPOSED FED. R.
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rather than a specific, rule to protect federal courts from the limitations
of the detailed privileges of the Proposed Rules and to allow the courts
to develop rules of privilege in accordance with the circumstances of
each case. 4 Because Congress did not disapprove of the Supreme
Court's proposed rules concerning privileges, several federal courts have
used Proposed Rules 502 to 510 to establish individual privileges that
5
are not unanimously recognized by federal courts.
Not all federal courts recognize the psychotherapist-patient privilege 6 articulated in Proposed Rule 504.7 Courts that fail to acknowledge
EVID. 505, 56 F.R.D. at 244-45; clergy-worshipper communications, PROPOSED FED. R.
EVID. 506, 56 F.R.D. at 247; political votes, PROPOSED FED. R. EvID. 507, 56 F.R.D. at 249;
trade secrets, PROPOSED FED. R. EVID. 508, 56 F.R.D. at 249-50; secrets of state and other
official information, PROPOSED FED. R. EvID. 509, 56 F.R.D. at 251-52; and identities of
informers, PROPOSED FED. R. EVID. 510, 56 F.R.D. at 255-56.
4 See United States v. Gillock, 445 U.S. at 367 (discussing S. REP. No. 1277, 93d Cong.,
2d Sess. 13 (1974)). Justice Gray, concurring in In re Pebsworth, 705 F.2d 261 (7th Cir. 1983),
recently stated that "[t]he intention of Congress in enacting Rule 501 was that 'recognition of
a privilege based on a confidential relationship and other privileges should be determined on
a case-by-case basis."' Id at 264-65 (Gray, J., concurring) (quoting S. REP. No. 1277, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1974)).
5 See, e.g., Trammel, 445 U.S. at 47 (Court used Proposed Rule 505 to establish husbandwife privilege); In re Zuniga, 714 F.2d 632 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 426 (1983) (court
used Proposed Rule 504 to recognize psychotherapist-patient privilege); Flora v. Hamilton,
81 F.R.D. 576, 579 (M.D.N.C. 1978) (court used Proposed Rule 504 to recognize psychotherapist-patient privilege).
6 In re Zuniga, 714 F.2d at 638. In Zuniga, the Sixth Circuit recently discussed the psychotherapist-patient privilege's "mixed reception" in the federal courts. See, e.g., United
States v. Lindstrom, 698 F.2d 1154 (1 1th Cir. 1983) (indicating psychotherapist-patient privilege does not exist); United States v. Meagher, 531 F.2d 752 (5th Cir.) (rejecting psychotherapist-patient privilege), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 853 (1976); Ramer v. United States, 411 F.2d 30
(9th Cir.) (assuming psychotherapist-patient privilege exists), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 965 (1969);
United States v. Witt, 542 F. Supp. 696 (S.D.N.Y.) (refusing to recognize psychotherapistpatient privilege), aty'd, 697 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1982); United States v. Layton, 90 F.R.D. 520
(N.D. Cal. 1981) (psychotherapist-patient privilege did not exist at common law and therefore not at federal law); United States v. Brown, 479 F. Supp. 1247 (D. Md. 1979) (no general
federal psychotherapist-patient privilege exists); Flora v. Hamilton, 81 F.R.D. 576
(M.D.N.C. 1978) (recognizing psychotherapist-patient privilege with certain exceptions).
7 PROPOSED FED. R. EvID. 504, 56 F.R.D. 183, 240-41 (1972). Proposed Rule 504 states:
(a) Definitions.
(1) A "patient" is a person who consults or is examined or interviewed by a psychotherapist.
(2) A "psychotherapist" is (A) a person authorized to practice medicine in any state
or nation, or reasonably believed by the patient so to be, while engaged in the diagnosis
or treatment of a mental or emotional condition, including drug addiction, or (B) a
person licensed or certified as a psychologist under the laws of any state or nation, while
similarly engaged.
(3) A communication is "confidential" if not intended to be disclosed to third persons other than those present to further the interest of the patient in the consultation,
examination, or interview, or persons reasonably necessary for the transmission of the
communication, or persons who are participating in the diagnosis and treatment under
the direction of the psychotherapist, including members of the patient's family.
(b) General rule of privilege. A patient has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to
prevent any other person from disclosing confidential communications, made for the

COMMENTS

[Vol. 75

a psychotherapist-patient privilege do not distinguish the psychotherapist-patient privilege from a physician-patient privilege. 8 These courts
posit that because a physician-patient privilege did not exist at common
law, the recognition of a psychotherapist-patient privilege under Federal
Rule of Evidence 501 would be inconsistent with "the principles of the
common law." 9
Courts that do recognize a psychotherapist-patient privilege, however, have followed Proposed Rule 504 and developed standards for the
scope of the privilege under Rule 501.10 These courts argue that "the
light of reason and experience" language of Rule 501 establishes a psychotherapist-patient privilege." Most important, the unique nature of
the psychotherapist-patient relationship, recognized by both the House
and Senate Judiciary Committees,' 2 mandates a recognition of the privilege by all federal courts.
purposes of diagnosis or treatment of his mental or emotional condition, including drug
addiction, among himself, his psychotherapist, or persons who are participating in the
diagnosis or treatment under the direction of the psychotherapist, including members of
the patient's family.
(c) Who may claim the privilege. The privilege may be claimed by the patient, by
his guardian or conservator, or by the personal representative of a deceased patient. The
person who was the psychotherapist may claim the privilege but only on behalf of the
patient. His authority so to do is presumed in the absence of evidence to the contrary.
(d) Exceptions.
(1) Proceedings for hospitalization. There is no privilege under this rule for communications relevant to an issue in proceedings to hospitalize the patient for mental
illness, if the psychotherapist in the course of diagnosis or treatment has determined that
the patient is in need of hospitalization.
(2) Examination by order of judge. If the judge orders an examination of the
mental or emotional condition of the patient, communications made in the course
thereof are not privileged under this rule with respect to the particular purpose for which
the examination is ordered unless the judge orders otherwise.
(3) Condition an element of claim or defense. There is no privilege under this rule
as to communications relevant to an issue of the mental or emotional condition of the
patient in any proceeding in which he relies upon the condition as an element of his
claim or defense, or, after the patient's death, in any proceeding in which any party relies
upon the condition as an element of his claim or defense.
Id
8 United States v. Lindstrom, 698 F.2d 1154, 1167 (11th Cir. 1983); United States v.
Meagher, 531 F.2d 752, 753 (5th Cir. 1976) (citing United States v. Harper, 450 F.2d 1032,
1035 (5th Cir. 1971)); Ramer v. United States, 411 F.2d 30, 39 (9th Cir. 1969). See 8 J.
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2380 (McNaughton rev. 1961).

9 See supra note 8 and cases cited therein; see also FED. R. EVID. 501.
10 In re Zuniga, 714 F.2d at 636-39; Hawaii Psychiatric Soc'y v. Ariyoshi, 481 F. Supp.
1028, 1038-40 (D. Hawaii 1979); Flora v. Hamilton, 81 F.R.D. at 578; Lora v. Board of
Educ., 74 F.R.D. 565, 584-87 (E.D.N.Y. 1977). The court in Lora v.Boardof Educalionstressed
that "[a]though Rule 504, along with other specific privilege rules, was rejected by Congress
in favor of the more general Rule 501, it still provides a useful standard from which analysis
can proceed." 74 F.R.D. at 584.
11 In re Zuniga, 714 F.2d 632, 639 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 426 (1983); Lora v.
Board of Educ., 74 F.R.D. 565, 578 (E.D.N.Y. 1977).
12 S. REP. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1974); H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1597, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess. 7-8 (1974).
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The several courts that recognize the vitality of a psychotherapistpatient privilege reason that the privilege is not absolute. Rather, a
court must balance the interests in protecting the desired information
with the interests in disclosing the requested material.13 In addition, the
courts acknowledge several exceptions to the psychotherapist-patient
14
privilege.
The Supreme Court has not decided whether a psychotherapistpatient privilege exists under Rule 501.15 The Court should acknowledge that the unique nature of the psychotherapist-patient relationship
mandates the existence of the privilege under Federal Rule of Evidence
501. The Court then should explicate the scope of the psychotherapistpatient privilege by balancing the interests protected by the privileged
communications with the interests advanced by disclosure of the requested information. Finally, the Court should provide an analysis of
exceptions to the psychotherapist-patient privilege.
II.
A.

THE EXISTENCE OF THE PRIVILEGE UNDER RULE

501

THE RATIONALE FOR THE PSYCHOTHERAPIST-PATIENT PRIVILEGE

Dean Wigmore developed four postulates to determine the validity
of a privilege. Wigmore's four tests are: (1) Does the communication in
the usual circumstances of the given professional relation originate in a
confidence that it will not be disclosed? (2) Is the inviolability of that
confidence essential to the achievement of the purpose of the relationships? (3) Is the relation one that should be fostered? and (4) Is the expected injury to the relation, through the fear of later disclosure, greater
than the expected benefit to justice in obtaining the testimony? 16 The
psychotherapist-patient privilege satisfies all four criteria. First, confidence and trust are the bases of the psychotherapist-patient relationship.
Patients intend that their communications with the psychotherapist will
13 In re Zuniga, 714 F.2d at 639-40; Flora, 81 F.R.D. at 578-79; Lora, 74 F.R.D. at 576-84.
14 In re Zuniga, 714 F.2d at 640-41; In re Pebsworth, 705 F.2d 261, 262-64 (7th Cir. 1983);
Meagher,531 F.2d at 753 (court rejected physican-patient privilege, but discussed exceptions to
psychotherapist-patient privilege under Proposed Rule 504); Harper,450 F.2d at 1035 (court
discussed exceptions to Mississippi statute that Mississippi courts have recognized); Ramer, 411
F.2d at 39. See PROPOSED FED. R. EVID. 504, 56 F.R.D. at 241. See infra notes 117-44 and
accompanying text.
15 The Supreme Court recently denied certiorari to the appellants in In re Zunga and
refused to rule whether or not the privilege exists. Zuniga v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 426
(1983).
16 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2286, at 527 (McNaughton rev. 1961). The privilege must
satisfy all criteria to be valid. Id. In his treatise on evidence, Professor Wigmore does not
discuss how he developed these four postulates for determining the existence of a privilege.
See id. at § 2286.
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remain secret. 17 Psychotherapy is grounded upon "confidential personal
revelations about matters which the patient is and should be normally
reluctant to discuss. . . . [The communications] always originate in a
18
confidence that they will not be divulged."
Second, the "inviolability" of the confidence between the psychotherapist and patient is the keystone of the relationship and of successful
treatment for the patient. 19 The requirement of confidentiality between
a psychotherapist and a patient inheres in the psychotherapist's ability
to cure the patient: "His capacity . . . is completely dependent upon
[the patient's] willingness and ability to talk freely. This makes it difficult if not impossible for him to function without being able to assure his
' 20
patients of confidentiality and, indeed, privileged communication.
Third, the psychotherapist-patient relationship should be nurtured
21
because individuals benefit from treatment of their mental disabilities.
Non-privileged psycotherapist-patient communications result in irreparable injury to mentally ill persons. 22 Patients who fear that their psy17 In re Zuniga, 714 F.2d at 638; Lora, 74 F.R.D. at 575. See Slovenko, Pjych'atoy and a
Second Look at the Medical Privilege, 6 WAYNE L. REV. 175, 184-85 (1960).
18 Slovenko, supra note 17, at 184-85.
19 Id at 185-92.
20 In re Zuniga, 714 F.2d at 638 (quoting Report No. 45, Group for the Advancement of
Psychiatry 92 (1960), quoted in PROPOSED FED. R. EvID. 504 advisory committee note, 56
F.R.D. at 242). The Advisory Committee's Notes to Proposed Rule 504 also state:
The relationship [between a psychotherapist and patient] may well be likened to that of
the priest-penitent or the lawyer-client. Psychiatrists not only explore the very depths of
their patients' conscious, but their unconscious feelings and attitudes as well. Therapeutic effectiveness necessitates going beyond a patient's awareness and, in order to do this,
it must be possible to communicate freely. A threat to secrecy blocks successful
treatment.
PROPOSED FED. R. EvID. 504 advisory committee note, 56 F.R.D. 183, 242 (1972) (quoting
Report No. 45, Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry 92 (1960)).
21 See Slovenko, supra note 17, at 192-93.
22 In re Zuniga, 714 F.2d at 639; HawaiiPvchiatricSoc)', 481 F. Supp. at 1052. The court
in Hawaii Psychiatric Society emphasized that "[t]he failure of an individual to seek care or to
receive adequate care may result in serious and irreversible harm to that individual." Id.
In Zuniga, for example, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) had tried to interview
several patients of Dr. Zuniga about their treatments. Several of these patients suffered "serious relapses" as a result of the FBI investigations. Brief for Appellant at 10, In re Zuniga, 714
F.2d 632 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 426 (1983). In their brief, the appellants described
the injuries to Zuniga's patients that resulted from the FBI's investigations of these
individuals:
One patient who had been suicidal in the past but was in a state of "remission" renewed
his statements that he would take his own life. Other patients contacted the doctor in a
very distraught frame of mind and demanded immediate consultation to alleviate their
fears. . . . Many feared that their psychiatrist who they rely upon to survive their particular torment, would no longer be available. . . . Tape recordings exist in which the
patients describe how they were treated by the F.B.I. who appeared at their homes,
unannounced and began questioning the patients about the nature of the treatment received from Dr. Zuniga. All the patients were shocked and alarmed upon realizing that
the F.B.I. was aware that they were obtaining psychiatric treatment. . . . Ironically,
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chotherapist will disclose confidential information to third parties are
inhibited in their revelations to their doctor and deterred from seeking
treatment for their ills.23 Afflicted persons would continue to suffer from
their malaise and would be prevented from seeking cures that would
24
allow them to function as healthy individuals.
In addition to the patients' interest in obtaining effective treatment
through privileged communications with their psychotherapists, society
also has a strong interest in protecting the psychotherapist-patient relationship. The public benefits in two ways from "encouraging the psychologically handicapped to seek and fully cooperate in
psychotherapeutic counseling." 25 The community obviously benefits
from the successful treatment of mentally ill persons who pose a possible
danger to society. 26 Furthermore, mentally fit individuals have greater
capacities for economic, emotional, and political productivity than men27
tally disabled persons.
Wigmore's fourth test is satisfied as well; the expected injury to the
patient and to society from fear of disclosure of information is usually
greater than the expected benefit from obtaining the information. 28 In
each case, however, a court must balance the injury against the benefit
in each case. 29 As one commentator has emphasized:
A great deal of time is required before a psychiatrist is able to obtain
the necessary confidence of his patient, and if there were any suspicion of
revelation in the courtroom or anywhere else, the psychiatrist would not
have the benefit of the statement either for treatment of his patient or for
30
use in court. The denial of the privilege begets the worst of both worlds.
several patients['] problems revolve around the fear of being harassed and persecuted by
the government and/or F.B.I.
Id.
23 Slovenko, supra note 17, at 192-93.
24 See In re Zuniga, 714 F.2d at 639; HawaiiPsychiatricSoc, 481 F. Supp. at 1038; Flora, 81
F.R.D. at 579; Lora, 74 F.R.D. at 571.
25 In re Zuniga, 714 F.2d at 639.
26 Id.
27 Id. The Zuniga court reasoned:
The inability to obtain effective psychiatric treatment may preclude the enjoyment and
exercise of many fundamental freedoms, particularly those protected by the First
Amendment. "Mental illness may prevent one from understanding religious and political ideas, or interfere with the ability to communicate ideas. Some level of mental
health is necessary to be able to form belief and value systems and to engage in rational
thought."
Id. (quoting Smith, ConstitutionalPriayin Pychotherapy, 49 GEO. WAsH. L. REv. 1, 27 (1980)).
The Sixth Circuit concluded that "[t]he interest of the patient in exercising his rights is also
society's interest, for society benefits from its members['] active enjoyment of their freedom."
714 F.2d at 639.
28 See In re Zuniga, 714 F.2d at 639.
29 See id. at 639-40; Lora, 74 F.R.D. at 576-77; Slovenko, supra note 17, at 193-94; see also
in/ta notes 84-116 and accompanying text.
30 Slovenko, supra note 17, at 193-94. Slovenko adds that "justice may indeed be served
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The Advisory Committee on the Proposed Rules and at least two
commentators agree that the psychotherapist-patient privilege satisfies
Wigmore's requirements.3 1 Moreover, the Senate Judiciary Committee's
report on Rule 501 specifically noted that Congress did not reject the
psychotherapist-patient privilege:
[I]n approving this general rule as to privileges, the action of Congress
should not be understood as disapproving any recognition of a psychiatrist-patient, or husband-wife, or any other of the enumerated privileges
contained in the Supreme Court rules. Rather, our action should be understood as reflecting the view that the recognition of a privilege based on
a confidential relationship
and other privileges should be determined on a
32
case-by-case basis.
Wigmore's four postulates provide a more than adequate rationale
for the existence of the psychotherapist-patient privilege. The basis for
the privilege, however, rests in the common law.
B.

THE BASIS OF THE PSYCHOTHERAPIST-PATIENT PRIVILEGE

Rule 501 instructs courts to use the principles of the common law to
develop privileges. 33 Although the common law did not recognize a
by closing the psychiatrist's mouth. Treatment is directed primarily toward the feelings and
attitudes which are unacceptable to the patient and others ....
[The production of these
feelings and attitudes] is necessary in treating the illness but devastating if revealed to ordinary scrutiny." Id.at 194.
31 The Advisory Committee cited Slovenko's analysis and stated that "Wigmore's four
conditions needed to justify the existence of a privilege are amply satisfied." 56 F.R.D. 183,
242 (1972). Professor Slovenko stated that "Wigmore, in his caustic criticism of the medical
privilege, did not consider psychotherapy. His four tests of legitimate privilege, however, are
here fulfilled .. " Slovenko, supra note 17, at 184.
Professor McCormick, a scholar on evidence, also has supported the psychotherapistpatient privilege:
On account of the special therapeutic need for assurance to the patient of protection
against disclosures it is cogently argued ... that even in states not having the physicianpatient privilege generally, a privilege should be recognized, by statute or decision, for
confidential disclosures to psychiatrists, qualified psychologists trained in the treatment
of mental disorders, and (in the court's discretion) general practitioners consulted for
diagnosis or treatment of mental disease .... "A privilege of [sic] those receiving psychotherapy is necessary if the psychiatric profession is to fulfill its medical responsibility
to its patients."

99, at 213 n.9 (E. Cleary 2d ed. 1972) (citations omitted) (quoting Slovenko, supra note 17, at 199). See also Note, ConfidentialCommunications to a Psychotherapist.- A New Tstimonial Privilege, 47 Nw. U.L. REV. 384 (1952).
32 S.REP. NO. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1974). For example, Congress' failure to
adopt Proposed Rule 503, the attorney-client privilege, did not indicate a disapproval of the
recognition of the attorney-client privilege. See United States v. King, 73 F.R.D. 103, 105
(E.D.N.Y. 1976). Also, Congress did not intend for courts to discontinue the clergy-worshipC. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE §

per privilege when Congress did not promulgate Proposed Rule 506. See PROPOSED FED. R.
EVID. 506, 56 F.R.D. at 247.
33 See FED. R. EvID. 501 ("privilege [law] . . . shall be governed by the principles of the
common law as they may be interpreted by the courts. . . in the light of reason and experience"); see also Taylor v. United States, 222 F.2d 398 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
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physician-patient privilege, "[the common law] had indicated a disposiwhen legislation to recognize a psychotherapist-patient privilege ...
'34
tures began moving into the field."
Several federal courts have acknowledged the common law origins
of the psychotherapist-patient privilege.35 In Lora v. Board of Education,

the District Court for the Eastern District of New York emphasized that
the common law had condoned the recognition of a psychotherapistpatient privilege even though it had not recognized a general physicianpatient privilege. 36 The court stated that because Rule 501 instructed
courts to determine privileges in accordance with the common law, Rule
501 controlled the psychotherapist-patient privilege.3 7 The court used
Proposed Rule 504 as a standard for analyzing the psychotherapist-patient privilege38 and explained at length why "it is desirable as a matter
of social policy to protect psychotherapist-patient confidences by an evidentiary privilege. .... -39
In In re Zuniga, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit also extensively analyzed the ambit of Rule 501 and ruled that it "[c]learly
. . . [gives] the Court the authority to recognize a psychiatrist-patient
privilege."40 The court then discussed the "compelling considerations"
of the psychotherapist-patient relationship that dictate a psychotherapist-patient privilege. 4 1 The Sixth Circuit concluded that the interests
promoted by a psychotherapist-patient privilege "in general, outweigh
the need for evidence in the administration of criminal justice"; 42 the
43
privilege exists, therefore, pursuant to Rule 501.
The widespread recognition of the psychotherapist-patient privilege by the states further supports recognition of the privilege under
34 PROPOSED FED. R. EVID. 504 advisory committee note, 56 F.R.D. 183, 242 (1972) (citing Note, supra note 31). See Lora, 74 F.R.D. at 575; see, e.g., Taylor v. United States, 222 F.2d
398 (D.C. Cir. 1955) (holding admission of testimony of mental hospital physician who had
treated defendant while committed pending competence to stand trial violated statute creating privilege as to facts learned by physician in treating patient).
35 See, e.g., In re Zuniga, 714 F.2d at 639; Flora, 81 F.R.D. at 578; Lora, 74 F.R.D. at 578;
United States ex re. Edney v. Smith, 425 F. Supp. 1038, 1045-46 (E.D.N.Y. 1976), af'd,556
F.2d 556 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 958 (1977).
36 74 F.R.D. 565, 575 (E.D.N.Y. 1977).
37 Id. at 578.
38 Id. at 578, 584. In United States ex reL Edney v. Smith, 425 F. Supp. 1038, 1045-46
(E.D.N.Y. 1976), ad, 556 F.2d 556 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 958 (1977), this same court
also had analyzed the psychotherapist-patient privilege within the framework of Proposed
Rule 504.
39 74 F.R.D. at 574.
40 714 F.2d 632, 637 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 426 (1983).
41 Id. at 638-39. See supra notes 17-32 and accompanying text.
42 714 F.2d at 639.
43 Id The Seventh Circuit, in In re Pebsworth, 705 F.2d 261, 262 (7th Cir. 1983), also held
that Rule 501 controlled the recognition of a psychotherapist-patient privilege. For a discussion of In re Pebsworlh, see infia notes 123-25 and accompanying text.
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Rule 501 by the federal courts. At present, forty-one states have statutes
that authorize the psychotherapist-patient privilege. 44 The Supreme
Court has ruled that "the privilege law as developed in the states is [not]
irrelevant. This Court has taken note of state privilege laws in deter'45
mining whether to retain them in the federal system."
Several federal courts have followed the Supreme Court's instruction and used the states' psychotherapist-patient privilege statutes to illustrate the need for and efficacy of the privilege under Rule 501.46
When the Sixth Circuit affirmed the privilege under Rule 501, for example, it acknowledged the overwhelming number of states that have
adopted psychotherapist-patient privilege statutes. 4 7 In Lora, the District Court for the Eastern District of New York also considered the
states' position on the privilege and examined New York law for guidance.4 8 The court acknowledged that the State of New York's psychotherapist-patient privilege statute also supported the establishment of a
49
federal evidentiary psychotherapist-patient privilege.
44 See ALA. CODE § 34-26-2 (1975 & Supp. 1983); ALASKA R. CT. § 504 (1980); ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 32-2085 (1976); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 28-1001 (1979); CAL. EVID. CODE

§§ 1010-28 (West 1966 & Supp. 1984); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-90-107(g) (1973 & Supp.
1981); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-146(c)-(j) (West Supp. 1983); DEL. UNIF. R. EVID. 503
(1980); D.C. CODE ANN. § 14-307 (1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90-503 (West 1979); GA. CODE
ANN. § 38-418 (1981 & Supp. 1982); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 33-626 (1980); IDAHO CODE § 542314 (1979); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 91-1/2, §§ 801-817 (Supp. 1983); IND. CODE ANN. § 25-331-17 (Burns 1982 & Supp. 1983); Ky. REV. STAT. § 421.215 (1972); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 13:3734 (West Supp. 1983); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 4015 (1964 & Supp. 1983); MD.
CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 9-109 (1980 & Supp. 1983); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
233, § 20B (West 1974 & Supp. 1983); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 330.1750 (West 1980);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.02 (West 1947 & Supp. 1984); Miss. CODE ANN. § 73-31-29 (1972 &
Supp. 1983); Mo. ANN. STAT, § 337.055 (Vernon Supp. 1984); MONT. CODE ANN. § 26-1-807
(1983); NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-504 (1979); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 49.215-.245 (1980); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 330-A. 19 (1966); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:14B-28 (West 1983); N.M. R. EvID. 504
(1983); N.Y. CIv. PRAC. LAW § 4507 (McKinney Supp. 1983); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-53.3
(1981 & Supp. 1983); N.D. R. EVID. 503 (Supp. 1983); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2503
(West 1980 & Supp. 1983); OR. REV. STAT. § 40.230 (1981); TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-1-207
(1980); UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-25-8 (Supp. 1983); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1612 (Supp.
1983); VA. CODE § 8.01-400.2 (Supp. 1983); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 18.83-110 (1978);
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 905.04 (West 1975 & Supp. 1983); WYo. STAT. § 33-27-103 (1977).

45 United States v. Gillock, 445 U.S. 360, 368 n.8 (1980) (involving evidentiary privilege
for state legislators in federal prosecutions).
46 See In re Zuniga, 714 F.2d at 638-39; see also Taylor, 222 F.2d at 401; Lora, 74 F.R.D. at
576.
47 n re Zuniga, 714 F.2d at 638-39.
48 74 F.R.D. at 576.
49 Id. The Lora court stated that because
"a strong policy of comity between state and federal sovereignties impels federal courts to
recognize state privileges where this can be accomplished at no substantial cost to federal
substantive and procedural policy"... [i]f the state holds out the expectation of protection to its citizens, they should not be disappointed by a mechanical and unnecessary
application of the federal rule.
Id. (quoting United States v. King, 73 F.R.D. 103, 105 (E.D.N.Y. 1976)).
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Although several federal courts have established that Rule 501
mandates a psychotherapist-patient privilege, 50 other courts have held
that Rule 501 is inapplicable to the psychotherapist-patient relationship. 5' These courts reason that because Rule 501 requires "reference to
the common law," and no equivalent physician-patient privilege existed
at common law, a psychotherapist-patient privilege does not exist under
Rule 501.52 The Courts of Appeals for the Fifth, Ninth, and Eleventh
Circuits have stated that the psychotherapist-patient relationship is indistinguishable from the physician-patient relationship.5 3 Because the
common law did not acknowledge a physician-patient privilege, the
'54
courts recognize "no such privilege in federal criminal trials today.
The psychotherapist-patient relationship, however, is readily distinguishable from the physician-patient relationship. 55 The existence and
50 See In re Zuniga, 714 F.2d 632 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 426 (1983); Taylor v.
United States, 222 F.2d 398 (D.C. Cir. 1955); Hawaii Psychiatric Soc'y v. Ariyoshi, 481 F.
Supp. 1028 (D. Hawaii 1979); Flora v. Hamilton, 81 F.R.D. 576 (M.D.N.C. 1978); Lora v.
Board of Educ., 74 F.R.D. 565 (E.D.N.Y. 1977). The court in HawaiiPsychiatricSociety explicitly stated that "[t]here is no history ofjudicial, legislative or public acceptance of government
access to confidential communications between a psychiatrist and his patient. To the contrary, courts, legislators and commentators have long agreed on the need to protect those
communications from disclosure." 481 F. Supp. at 1048-49.
51 See United States v. Lindstrom, 698 F.2d 1154 (1I1th Cir. 1983); United States v. Meagher, 531 F.2d 752 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v. Harper, 450 F.2d 1032 (5th Cir. 1971);
United States v. Layton, 90 F.R.D. 520 (N.D. Cal. 1981).
52 See supra note 51 and cases cited therein. In Lindstrom, the Eleventh Circuit equated the
psychotherapist-patient relationship with the relationship between physicians and their patients and stated that "[t]here is no federal statute creating such a privilege." 698 F.2d at
1167 n.9. The court did not consider the language or legislative intent of Rule 501.
In Layton, the District Court for the Northern District of California also held that "the
psychotherapist-patient privilege is inapplicable .... [I]n federal courts privileges are defined by reference to the common law." 90 F.R.D. at 525. The court in Layton, however,
incorrectly stated that "[t]he federal courts have universally recognized that no such privilege
existed at common law and that [it] therefore does not exist in federal courts." Id. (citations
omitted). See supra notes 35-49 and accompanying text.
53 See Lindstrom, 698 F.2d at 1167 n.9 (Eleventh Circuit held that lower court had committed reversible error by denying mail fraud defendants access to psychiatric material concerning the government's witness because "[a]t common law there was no physician-patient
privilege. There is no federal statute creating such a privilege. Therefore, testimony concerning the doctor-patient relationship is admissible in Federal Court."); Meagher,531 F.2d at
753 (Fifth Circuit held admissible bank robbery defendant's letters to psychiatrist because no
physician-patient privilege is recognized in federal criminal trials); Harper,450 F.2d at 1035
(Fifth Circuit held admissible testimony of two psychiatrists that defendant was sane at time
he unlawfully manufactured methadone because "[a]t common law there was no physicianpatient privilege. . . . And we know of no federal statute creating such a privilege') (citations omitted); Ramer, 411 F.2d at 39 (Ninth Circuit held that defendant on trial for escape
from federal penitentiary could not claim that communications between himself and psychiatrist were privileged because "[t]he common law did not recognize as privileged the communications between physician and patient').
54 Meagher, 531 F.2d at 753. See Lindstrom, 698 F.2d at 1167 n.9; Harpe, 450 F.2d at 1035;
Ramer, 411 F.2d at 39.
55 InreZuniga, 714 F.2d at 638; Taylor,222 F.2d at 401. See PROPOSED FED.R. EVID. 504
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success of the psychotherapist-patient relationship depend upon the confidentiality of therapy sessions and diagnoses.5 6 In contrast, a patient
with physical ailments will, in most instances, consult a physician irrespective of whether the doctor insures the confidentiality of the consultation.57 The clear purpose of meeting with a physician is to remedy an
ill, usually of physiological origin, that might become more debilitating
58
and painful if left untreated.
Persons with mental and emotional problems, however, hope that
they can uncover the source of their problems by revealing their private
personalities; successful treatment results from the patient's "letting
down [his] defenses." 59 In psychotherapy, patients often act without regard to social conventions and differently from the way they conduct
themselves in daily life. 60 Patients' fears that their unconventional actions might be disclosed are forceful deterrents against seeking treatment.6 1 Also, patients' apprehension of societal ridicule of their mental
problems may cause them to avoid consultations with psychotherapists
62
about their ailments.
advisory committee note, 56 F.R.D. 183, 242 (1972); M. GUTrMACHER & H. WEIHOFEN,
PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 272 (1952); Slovenko, supra note 17, at 184-85.
56 See supra note 55 and authorities cited therein.
57 Taylor, 222 F.2d at 401.
58 M. GUTTMACHER & H. WEIHOFEN, supra note 55, at 272. See also Slovenko, supranote
17, at 185.
59 Slovenko, supra note 17, at 185. See In re Zuniga, 714 F.2d at 638; Taylor, 222 F.2d at
40 1. The court in Taylor distinguished a patient's relationship with a physician from his relationship with a psychotherapist:
Many physical ailments might be treated with some degree of effectiveness by a doctor
whom the patient did not trust, but a psychiatrist must have his patient's confidence or
he cannot help him. "The psychiatric patient confides more utterly than anyone else in
the world. He exposes to the therapist not only what his words directly express; he lays
bare his entire self, his dreams, his fantasies, his sins, and his shame. Most patients who
undergo psychotherapy know that this is what will be expected of them, and that they
cannot get help except on that condition. . . .It would be too much to expect them to
do so if they knew that all they say-and all that the psychiatrist learns from what they
say-may be revealed to the whole world from a witness stand."
Taylor, 222 F.2d at 401 (quoting M. GurTMACHER & H. WEIHOFEN, supra note 55, at 272).
60 Slovenko, supra note 17, at 185. Slovenko illustrates that patients' actions in psychotherapy are different from their everyday conduct: "[A] minister in psychotherapy reveals
aggressive attributes; a patient at the end of each session leaves without saying goodbye; a
lady of society regularly greets her psychiatrist with the rebuke, 'Haven't you lost weight yet,
you fat little fool?'; a preacher's wife talks about fecal matter." Id.
61 Slovenko warns that because a patient's actions in psychotherapy are often different
from his or her actions in daily life, "[rlevelation by the psychiatrist of the patient's inner self
would be disastrous to the patient's reputation and standing in the community." Slovenko,
supra note 17, at 185.
62 Wisconsin Psychiatric Servs. v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 839 (1981). In Wisconsin Psychiatric Services, the court admonished:
Even in our modem society, the decision to go to a psychiatrist is a personal and
often difficult choice for a patient to make. We believe that there should be no social
stigma attached to seeking the assistance of a psychiatrist, and in fact that there should
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The Courts of Appeals for the District of Columbia and the Sixth
Circuits have emphasized the unique nature of the psychotherapist-patient relationship. 63 The District Court for the Eastern District of New

York also has expounded on the distinctiveness of the relationship and
has emphasized that "the pragmatic, empirical objections to the rationale of the general physician-patient privilege are not applicable to this
specialized relationship [between psychotherapists and patients]."64
Although the principles of the common law provide a basis for the
psychotherapist-patient privilege, some courts and commentators reason
that a constitutional right of privacy is a better foundation for the psychotherapist-patient privilege.6 5 Proponents of a constitutional base for
the privilege argue that the psychotherapist-patient privilege fulfills the
two strands of the constitutional right to privacy embodied in the
"penumbras" of the ninth amendment: the individual's interest in
avoiding disclosure of personal matters, and the interest in an individual's independence in making important personal decisions.6 6 The advocates of a constitutional psychotherapist-patient privilege suggest that
the constitutional right of privacy is a more secure foundation for a psychotherapist-patient privilege than Federal Rule of Evidence 501 because neither legislatures nor courts can remove a constitutionally
protected right.6 7 Congress, however, can withdraw a statute such as
be great respect for individuals who can recognize that they may have problems and who
have the courage to seek help. Nonetheless, we would be shortsighted if we did not
recognize that some people still view psychiatric patients as somehow "tainted" by their
visits to appropriate medical specialists. Unfortunately, public knowledge of a patient's
psychiatric care could have a detrimental impact on such patient's business and/or personal affairs and might even hinder the progress made in therapy by such patient.
Id. at 845-46. See a/so Slovenko, supranote 17, at 188 ("even those who are well-informed on
other matters, consider a person's treatment by a psychiatrist as evidence of his 'queerness' or
even insanity. . . . A person may hesitate to visit a psychiatrist out of fear that he will be set
apart from his fellow men') (citation omitted). But see Flora v. Hamilton, 81 F.R.D. 576, 579
(M.D.N.C. 1978) ("By and large, people are today satisfied that. . . there is no more disgrace
in being mentally ill than there is in suffering a heart ailment, poliomyelitis, or cancer")
(quoting Reid v. Moore-McCormack Lines, 49 F.R.D. 91, 94 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (quoting Killip
v. Rochester Gen. Hosp., 1 Misc. 2d 349, 351, 146 N.Y.S.2d 164, 167 (Sup. Ct. 1955))).
63 See In re Zuniga, 714 F.2d at 638; Taylor, 222 F.2d at 401.
64 United States ex rel Edney v. Smith, 425 F. Supp. 1038, 1043 (E.D.N.Y. 1976), aj'd,
556 F.2d 556 (2d Cir.), cerL denied, 431 U.S. 958 (1977). See Lora, 74 F.R.D. at 575.
65 See, e.g., Caesar v. Mountanos, 542 F.2d 1064 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 954
(1977); United States v. Layton, 90 F.R.D. 520 (N.D. Cal. 1981); Hawaii Psychiatric Soc'y v.
Ariyoshi, 481 F. Supp. 1028 (D. Hawaii 1979); Lora v. Board of Educ., 74 F.R.D. 565
(E.D.N.Y. 1977); see also Smith, supra note 27.
66 See, e.g., HawaiiPsychiatricSoo, 481 F. Supp. at 1037 (citing Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S.
589, 598-600 & n.24 (1977)). In the context of the psychotherapist-patient relationship, patients should have sole discretion as to whether persons other than the psychotherapist know
of the patient's mental state and relationship with the psychotherapist. See Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113, 209 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring) ("penumbras" of ninth amendment provide for
"right of privacy').
67 See Smith, sura note 27, at 45.
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Rule 501 that creates an individual entitlement. 68
Although the arguments rationalizing a constitutional right of privacy as the basis for the psychotherapist-patient privilege are valid, Federal Rule of Evidence 501 provides a firmer foundation for the privilege.
Two problems inhere in the argument that the right of privacy is the
basis for the privilege. First, the Supreme Court has stated that "[t]he
concept of a constitutional right of privacy remains largely undefined."'69 Second, the psychotherapist-patient privilege does not exist
merely because of a per se "right of privacy"; rather, the privilege is
necessary because privacy is the prerequisite to effective treatment of a
patient. The psychotherapist-patient privilege protects communications
between psychotherapists and their patients; without the privilege, the
patients would suffer direct injury from disclosure of the confidential
information. 70 The "irreparable injury" to the patient results because
confidentiality and trust between the psychotherapist and the patient
71
are each a sine qua non to treatment of the patient.
The principles of the common law, the statutory establishment of
the privilege by most states, and the extensive benefits to the patient and
to society from the privilege, therefore, dictate a psychotherapist-patient
privilege under Federal Rule of Evidence 501. The Supreme Court
should affirmatively establish the privilege under Rule 501. Such a ruling by the Court would settle the debate among the federal courts over
the existence of the psychotherapist-patient privilege. In addition to
recognizing the psychotherapist-patient privilege under Rule 501, the
Supreme Court should define the scope of the privilege.
III.

THE SCOPE OF THE PSYCHOTHERAPIST-PATIENT PRIVILEGE
UNDER RULE

A.

501

THE FLEXIBILITY OF THE PSYCHOTHERAPIST-PATIENT PRIVILEGE

Courts should determine the scope of the psychotherapist-patient
68 Id.

69 Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598 n.24 (1977). Also, the Report of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary on Rule 501 stated that the psychotherapist-patient privilege was one of
nine rules "defin[ing] specific nonconstitutionalprivileges which the Federal courts must recognize. . . ." S. REP. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1974) (emphasis supplied). See aLroJ.P.
v. DeSanti, 653 F.2d 1080, 1087-90 (6th Cir. 1981) ("The Constitution does not explicitly
mention a right of privacy. Nor has the Supreme Court recognized the existence of a general
right to privacy. . . . [W]e conclude that the Constitution does not encompass a general
right to nondisclosure of private information").
70 Sesupra notes 21-24 and accompanying text. Of course, nothing prohibits the patients
from disclosing the facts and outcomes of their treatments to others. See, e.g., Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 684 (1977) (the "liberty" protected by the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment includes "a right of personal privacy, or a guarantee of certain
areas or zones of privacy').
71 See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
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privilege through a balancing of the interests guarded by protecting the
desired information with the interests supported by disclosing the information. 72 Rules of privilege are "sometimes mistakenly characterized as
conferring 'absolute' or 'unqualified' immunity [upon the persons claiming the privilege]." ' 7" Rather, the rules of privilege are flexible; in each
case, courts must balance competing interests to determine "as a matter
of social and legal policy" whether the evidentiary privilege should ex74
tend to the specific communications requested for discovery.
The Federal Rules of Evidence promote the "fundamental and
comprehensive need in our adversary system to develop all relevant facts
before the trier [of fact] . . . 'to the end that truth may be ascer-

tained.' "75 The Supreme Court has emphasized that "[t]he very integrity of the judicial system and public confidence in the system depend
on full disclosure of all the facts, within the framework of the rules of
evidence. ' 76 For each case, therefore, a court must weigh the benefits
that accrue to the patient and to society from keeping all evidence of
communications between the psychotherapist and the patient confidential against society's interest in gathering all information relevant to enforcement of its laws. 77 A party's reason for wanting the communication

disclosed and the party's proposed use of the communication at trial also
78
determine whether a communication is privileged.
In a federal criminal trial, for example, a defendant might want to
use communications between a psychotherapist and a patient who is
also an opposing witness to impeach the witness. 79 The defendant's "in72 See, e.g., In re Zuniga, 714 F.2d at 639-42; HawaiiPsychiatricSoc_, 481 F. Supp. at 103745; Flora, 81 F.R.D. at 579; Lora, 74 F.R.D. at 576-78.
73 Lora, 74 F.R.D. at 577.
74 Id

75 Id. at 578 (quoting FED. R. EvID. 102). Rule 102, Purpose and Construction of the
Federal Rules of Evidence, provides:
These rules shall be construed to secure fairness in administration, elimination of
unjustifiable expense and delay, and promotion of growth and development of the law of
evidence to the end that the truth may be ascertained and proceedings justly
determined.
FED. R. EVID. 102.

76 United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709 (1974).
77 See, e.g., In re Zuniga, 714 F.2d 632, 640 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 426 (1983). In
In re Zuniga, the court weighed the fact that some persons would refrain from seeing a psychiatrist because the record of their treatment might become known against society's important
interest in ascertaining all facts relevant to the trial. Id. at 640. See in/a notes 85-95 and
accompanying text.
78 See United States v. Brown, 479 F. Supp. 1247, 1253 (D. Md. 1979).
79 See, e.g., United States v. Society of Indep. Gasoline Marketers, 624 F.2d 461 (4th Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1078 (1981); United States v. Brown, 479 F. Supp. 1247 (D. Md.
1979). In Society of Independent Gasoline Marketers, the Fourth Circuit explicated a process to

determine whether it should disclose to the defense a report about the mental health of a chief
government witness. The court stated:
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terest in receiving a fair trial-including the opportunity to conduct a
full cross-examination and to impeach [the witness-must be weighed
against] . . . the need to spare [the witness] . . . from harassment, annoyance or humiliation." 8 0
In another case, the defendant in a criminal trial may claim an
absolute privilege to communications that arose from a psychotherapistpatient relationship.8 1 The defendant may be either a patient claiming
that the privilege protects the information disclosed to the psychotherapist, 82 or a psychotherapist claiming that the patient's privilege protects
83
the patient's records from disclosure.
In all instances, courts should develop reasonable alternatives to
conferring an absolute privilege or unilaterally granting full disclosure
of the information. Courts should limit disclosure to information that is
necessary to the proceeding and disclose only to qualified individuals
under strict controls of confidentiality. Disclosure made in this manner
"If the report contains only material impeaching the witness, disclosure is required only
when there is a reasonable likelihood of affecting the trier of the fact. Whether there is
such a likelihood depends upon a number of factors such as the importance of the witness
to the government's case, the extent to which the witness has already been impeached,
and the significance of the new impeaching material on the witness' credibility."
624 F.2d at 469 (quoting United States v. Figurski, 545 F.2d 389, 391-92 (4th Cir. 1976)).
80 Brown, 479 F. Supp. at 1254. In Brown, the defendant appealed a conviction on charges
of giving false testimony before a grand jury. Although the court allowed defense counsel to
question the key government witness about some aspects of her mental and emotional state,
the court stressed that the witness was "entitled to some protection of her personal records
• . . and to protection against undue harassment and humiliation." Id. at 1258.
On the other hand, the court in United States v. Lindstrom stated that a "desire to spare a
witness embarrassment which disclosure of medical records might entail is insufficient justification for withholding such records from criminal defendants on trial for their liberty." 698
F.2d 1154, 1167 (11th Cir. 1983).
81 See, e.g., In re Zuniga, 714 F.2d 632 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 426 (1983); In re
Pebsworth, 705 F.2d 261 (7th Cir. 1983); Taylor v. United States, 222 F.2d 398 (D.C. Cir.
1955); United States v. Layton, 90 F.R.D. 520 (N.D. Cal. 1981).
82 See Taylor, 222 F.2d 398 (defendant convicted of robbery, housebreaking, and grand
larceny claimed that admission of testimony of mental hospital physician who had treated
him was in violation of psychotherapist-patient privilege); Layton, 90 F.R.D. 520 (defendant
prosecuted on four criminal counts arising from death of United States Congressman claimed
that psychotherapist-patient privilege protected from discovery tapes made of conversation
between himself and psychiatrist). In Taylor, the court ruled that the lower court had violated
the patient-defendant's psychotherapist-patient privilege by admitting the testimony of the
mental hospital physician. 222 F.2d at 398. In Layton, the district court held that the defendant could protect the taped conversations between himself and his psychotherapist from discovery. 90 F.R.D. at 520.
83 See In re Zuniga, 714 F.2d 632 (psychotherapists under investigation for Blue Cross-Blue
Shield fraud refused to submit patient records to grand jury on grounds of privilege); In re
Pebsworth, 705 F.2d 261 (psychotherapist under investigation for criminal misconduct for
medical insurance fraud claimed psychotherapist-patient privilege protected records from discovery); see also PROPOSED FED. R. EvID. 504(c), 56 F.R.D. 183, 241. Because the psychotherapist presumably acts as the patient's representative and in the patient's best interests, the
psychotherapist may claim the privilege on behalf of the patient.
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will ensure the narrowest possible psychological harm to the patient.
At the same time, such disclosure will allow the government and the
defense to develop all facts relevant to the criminal proceeding at issue.
B.

USE OF A BALANCING ANALYSIS TO DETERMINE THE SCOPE OF
THE PSYCHOTHERAPIST-PATIENT PRIVILEGE UNDER RULE

501
Courts can achieve the proper balance among the competing interests and determine the amount and type of information that should be
disclosed through consideration of the following questions:
First, is the identification of the individuals required for effective use
of the data? Second, is the invasion of privacy and risk of psychological
harm being limited to the narrowest possible extent? Third, will the data
be supplied only to qualified personnel under strict controls
over confiden84
tiality? Fourth, is the data necessary or simply desirable?
An examination of federal courts' decisions on psychotherapist-patient disclosures proves useful in understanding these postulates. In In re
Zuni'ga, the defendants were two psychotherapists who had refused to
respond to grand jury subpoenas for patient records in a Blue CrossBlue Shield fraud investigation. 5 The district court had limited the
subpoenas to the identities of the patients and the dates and lengths of
their treatments. 86 On appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit, the psychotherapists invoked the psychotherapist-patient privilege under Rule 501 in refusing to turn over the redacted patient
records.8 7 The Sixth Circuit recognized the psychotherapist-patient
privilege and emphasized that the district court had already prohibited
disclosure of the diagnostic files of the patients.8 8 The court stated that
although the psychotherapist-patient privilege protected the progress
notes from discovery, "the identity of a patient or the fact and time of
his treatment does not fall within the scope of the psychotherapist-patient privilege" because the "assurance to the patient that his innermost
thoughts may be revealed without fear of disclosure" is not negated by
84 Lora v. Board of Educ., 74 F.R.D. 565, 579 (E.D.N.Y. 1977). The court in Lora did not
explain how it developed these four questions. The court's analysis, however, provides a formal framework for the balancing methods used by other federal courts to determine the scope
of the psychotherapist-patient privilege. See infra notes 85-116 and accompanying text.
85 714 F.2d at 634. Privileges established under the Federal Rules of Evidence apply to all
federal grand jury proceedings, as well as to federal criminal and civil proceedings. See FED.
R. EVID. l101(b) (2).

86 714 F.2d at 640. Originally, the government also had requested patient files and progress notes. The district court judge, however, limited the production to the patients' names
and facts and times of the treatments because the patient files and progress notes were not
essential for the grand jury to make a complete investigation. Id. at 634-35.
87 Id. at 636.
88 Id at 634-35, 639.
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"mere disclosure of the patient's identity."8' 9 The court, however,
stressed that a court does have the discretion to protect the identities of
patients in cases that necessitate such protection. 90
The Sixth Circuit in Zun'ga analyzed all four postulates to determine the quantity and composition of information that the defendants
had to disclose to the grand jury. First, the court decided that all of the
information requested was not necessary for effective use of the data.91
The Sixth Circuit emphasized that the grand jury needed only the redacted records of the identities, evidence, and times of treatments to
fulfill the needs of the insurance fraud investigation; the court, therefore,
limited the grand jury to the information that would give it "effective
use of the data. ' 92 Second, the court limited disclosure to the identities,
facts, and times of treatment of the patients to minimize both invasions
93
of the patients' privacy and risks of psychological harm to the patients.
Third, only the grand jury would review the files, with a careful watch
over secrecy. 94 Fourth, the grand jury needed the identities of the patients and evidence of their treatments to carry out a proper investigation of the psychotherapists. 95
In In re Pebsworth, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit engaged in a similar analysis. 96 Pebsworth, like Zunzg'a, involved a psychotherapist under investigation for possible criminal misconduct in
defrauding medical insurance companies. 97 The psychotherapist had
opposed a grand jury request for the names, evidence of treatments, and
diagnoses of some of the doctor's patients on the grounds that production of the materials would violate the psychotherapist-patient privi89 Id. at 640.

90 Id. at 640 n.7. In Lora, for example, the court protected the identities of the patients
from disclosure, but ruled that their records were not privileged. 74 F.R.D. at 586-87. Lora
involved a civil rights action against the Board of Education of the City of New York for
racially motivated placements of students in the city's emotionally disturbed education program. The court ruled that the plaintiffs' need for clinical and other data did not encompass
the identity of the subject students. 74 F.R.D. at 565. The court reasoned that "[m]ost persons protest not the mere disclosure of private embarrassing or damaging information, but
rather the concomitant disclosure of identifying data." 74 F.R.D. at 580 (citations omitted).
91 714 F.2d at 640.
92 Id. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
93 714 F.2d at 640.
94 Id.

95 Id The grand jury was investigating whether or not the patients for whom the doctors
claimed Blue Cross reimbursements had, in fact, visited the doctors for treatment. Id. at 634.
96 705 F.2d 261 (7th Cir. 1983). The Seventh Circuit assumed arguendo the existence of a
psychotherapist-patient privilege for the purpose of determining whether the patients had
waived their privilege by explicitly authorizing disclosure of their psychotherapy records to
Blue Cross-Blue Shield as part of the insurance reimbursement process. Id. at 262. See infra
notes 123-25 and accompanying text.
97 Id at 262.
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lege. 98 The court stated that the requested documents were
"administrative rather than substantive in nature, and the success of a
criminal investigation into the abuse of the psychotherapeutic care system [was] . . .at stake." 99 The court explained that it might have decided differently if the requested information involved substantive
psychological analyses of the patient, rather than the insignificant material under subpoena. "° The court further emphasized that its decision
did not put patients
to the unconscionable Hobson's choice of either receiving no treatment or
receiving treatment only at the cost of making public their illness. . .[because] the grand jury, related investigative bodies, and, if an indictment is
returned, the trial court, will take scrupulous measures to ensure that
there
01
occurs no unnecessary disclosure of patients' names or diagnoses.
In In re Pebsworth, the Seventh Circuit found that each of the balancing criteria was fulfilled. The court determined that the data disclosed was necessary to the success of the investigation. 102 Because the
documents were "administrative rather than substantive," potential
harm to the patients was limited as much as possible.10 3 Also, the court
emphasized that the personnel who would have access to the informa04
tion would preserve the confidence of the patients' identities and files. 1
In United States v. Brown, the defendant moved for a new trial fol05
lowing a conviction for giving false testimony before a grand jury.'
The defense wanted to question the key prosecution witness about her
mental and emotional history and requested the trial court to subpoena
her mental hospital records.' 0 6 The witness claimed that the psychotherapist-patient privilege prohibited the defense from acquiring these

files. 107
The District Court for the District of Maryland in Brown took
"scrupulous measures" to insure that the subpoenaed mental hospital
records concerning the government's chief witness were not disclosed
frivolously during any of the pretrial hearings or at trial. 108 The court
held in camera hearings and sealed the transcripts of the proceedings. 109
The court, the witness, and the witness' attorney reviewed the hospital
98 Id.
99 Id at 263.
100 Id
101 Id. at 264.
102 Id. at 263.
103 Id
104 Id at 264.
105 479 F. Supp. 1247 (D.Md. 1979).
106 Id at 1251.
107 Id
108 Id.at 1253-54.
109 Id at 1251.
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records."t 0 The court then decided that the psychiatric records contained nothing relating to the charges against the defendant, the government's prosecution of the defendant, or to the defendant's relationship
with the witness.'
Because the records were not "sufficiently relevant
or material to any issues, including those of credibility and reliability,"
the defense could not examine the records or use them at trial. 12
The court in Brown also fulfilled all of the balancing criteria. The
court decided that the psychiatric records were not "necessary" for determination of any of the issues at trial. 1 3 By prohibiting disclosure of
all of the requested information, the court did not have to consider how
much information was necessary for "effective use of the data." 1 4 The
court limited the "invasion of privacy and risk of psychological harm to
the narrowest possible extent" by holding in camera hearings and by
sealing the transcripts of the proceedings.' 5 Also, only the court, the
116
witness, and the witness' attorney examined the psychiatric records.
The four-part balancing analysis allows courts to evaluate the interests of the parties to a proceeding and provides courts with a framework
for deciding how much and what type of the requested information a
party may discover. In addition to considering the balancing criteria
that define the scope of the psychotherapist-patient privilege in each
case, a court must examine three specific exceptions to the privilege.
C.

EXCEPTIONS TO THE PSYCHOTHERAPIST-PATIENT PRIVILEGE

The necessary balancing of interests circumscribes the scope of the
psychotherapist-patient privilege. In addition, limits on the purview of
the privilege arise from established exceptions to the privilege.
Three exceptions to the psychotherapist-patient privilege are relevant to a discussion of the use of the privilege in criminal proceedings:
communications that the patient made with the expectation that they
would be disclosed to third parties; communications made pursuant to a
110 Id.
111 Id. at 1251-52.

112 Id at 1251. The court emphasized that
the defendant does not have the unrestricted right to cross-examine adverse witnesses on
any matter desired[,] . . . the cross-examination must be shown to be relevant. The
determination of relevancy is within the discretion of the trial court.
. .[S]ome
[
topics may be of such minimal relevance that the trial court would be
justified either in totally prohibiting cross-examination about them or in allowing only
limited questioning.
Id at 1253 (citations omitted).
113 Id.at 1251-52.
114 Id.
115 Id.at 1251.
116 Id
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judge-ordered mental examination of the patient; and communications
concerning a mental condition that the patient raises in court as an element of the patient's defense. t t 7 Only in these three instances is "the
need for disclosure . . . sufficiently great to justify the risk of possible
impairment of the [psychotherapist-patient] relationship."' " 8 Proposed
Federal Rule of Evidence 504 elucidates all of the three exceptions. 1 9
Proposed Rule 504(a)(3) states that "[a] communication is 'confidential' if not intended to be disclosed to third persons other than those
present to further the interest of the patient in the consultation,. . . or
persons reasonably necessary for the transmission of the communication
....
,"120 The psychotherapist-patient privilege protects the patient's
discretion to decide whether or not information about the patient's
mental state may be disclosed to persons other than the patient's psychotherapist. If patients choose to tell others about their emotional condition and therapy, therefore, patients do not intend the specific
information to be privileged. 12 1 Also, the patient waives the privilege if
the patient makes a communication with the knowledge that it will be
disclosed to persons other than the psychotherapist and individuals inti22
mately associated with the patient's treatment.
In In re Pebsworth, the Seventh Circuit addressed whether the pa117 See PROPOSED FED. R. EVID. 504(a)(3), 504(d), 56 F.R.D. at 241,243-44. See, e.g., In re
Zuniga, 714 F.2d at 640-41 ("intent" waiver); In re Pebsworth, 705 F.2d at 263-64 ("intent"
waiver); Meagher,531 F.2d at 753 (defendant raising own mental state as element of defense);
Harper,450 F.2d at 1034 (court-ordered examination); Ramer, 411 F.2d at 39-41 (court-ordered
examination); Layton, 90 F.R.D. at 522 (defendant raising own mental state as element of
defense); Flora, 81 F.R.D. at 579-80 (party raising own mental state as element of claim);
Lora, 74 F.R.D. at 585-86 ("intent" waiver).
Proposed Rule 504(d)(1), the exception for hospitalization proceedings, does not apply in
criminal cases because the exception is relevant only in civil court proceedings to hospitalize
the patient for mental illness. See supra note 7.
118 PROPOSED FED. R. EvID. 504 advisory committee note, 56 F.R.D. at 244. Some commentators posit that other exceptions to the privilege exist, including exceptions for "future
crime and dangerousness," "criminal defense," "child abuse," and "death of the holder of the
privilege." See Smith, supra note 27, at 53-59. Courts generally have not recognized these
exceptions, and Proposed Rule 504 did not include them. Professor Weinstein, however, considers valid only the three exceptions stated in Proposed Rule 504. 2 J. WEINSTEIN, EvIDENCE 504[05], at 504-24-25, 504-25 n.9 (1982). Weinstein emphasizes that "[a] furtherance
of crime or fraud exception was rejected as unnecessary and harmful," id. at 504-28, because
as a class, patients willing to express to psychiatrists their intentions to commit crime are
not ordinarily likely to carry out that intention. Inste~ad, they are making a plea for help.
The very making of these pleas affords the psychiatrist his unique opportunity to work
with patients in an attempt to resolve their problems. Such resolution would be impeded
if patients were unable to speak freely for fear of possible disclosure at a later date in a
legal proceeding.
Id. at 504-24-25 (citations omitted).
119 PROPOSED FED. R. EvID. 504, 56 F.R.D. at 243-44.
120 PROPOSED FED. R. EvID. 504(a)(3), 56 F.R.D. at 241 (emphasis supplied).
121 See Lora, 74 F.R.D. at 585.
122 See In re Zuniga, 714 F.2d at 640.
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tient's authorization of disclosure of his treatment to Blue Cross-Blue
Shield constituted a waiver of the psychotherapist-patient privilege with
regard to the limited information requested by the government.1 23 The
court ruled that the patients had knowingly and intentionally relinquished any privilege to the billing and administrative records by assenting to publicize the records through the Blue Cross-Blue Shield
reimbursement claims procedure. 124 The court, however, acknowledged
that
[w]hile we might well have decided differently if the information sought
under the subpoena involved detailed psychological profiles of patients or
substantive accounts of therapy sessions, it cannot be said that the subsequent disclosure of such fragmentary data as is involved here as part of the
insurance company's legal duties in assisting a federal criminal investiga125
tion would be beyond the contemplation of the patients' waiver.
The Sixth Circuit in In re Zunzga adopted the Seventh Circuit's "intent"-waiver analysis and ruled that even if the identities, evidence, and
times of treatments of patients were within the ambit of the psychotherapist-patient privilege, the patients had waived the privilege to the extent of their disclosure of such information on their insurance forms. 126
In Zu'ga, as in In re Pebsworth, the patients had already disclosed their
1 27
identities to Blue Cross-Blue Shield.
In addition to the "intent" exception to the psychotherapist-patient
privilege, the privilege does not extend to communications made in the
course of a judge-ordered examination of the mental or emotional condition of the patient.1 28 The Advisory Committee's Note to Proposed
Rule 504 explained that
[i]n a court ordered examination, the relationship is likely to be an arm's
123 705 F.2d 261, 262 (7th Cir. 1983).
124 Id. In a concurring opinion, however, Judge Gray did not agree that the patients'
disclosure of their records to Blue Cross-Blue Shield constituted a waiver of the psychotherapist-patient privilege:
It seems to me that the traditional waiver doctrines are inappropriate in the context of
present-day medical insurance ....
Thorough reliance upon the confidential relationship with the doctor is particularly
important to a psychiatric patient, because of the very nature of the problem that brings
the two together. Such a patient may, with reluctance, recognize the practical necessity
for disclosure of his identity and perhaps other information to the insurance carrier. But
it by no means follows that because of this he may be deemed to have consented to
become involved in a criminal investigation.
Id at 264 (Gray, J., concurring).
125 Id. at 263.
126 714 F.2d at 640. The court stated that "the Seventh Circuit's waiver analysis is sound
and fully applicable to the case at bar and this Court adopts that analysis." Id. at 641.
127 Id. at 640.

128 See, e.g., United States v. Harper, 450 F.2d 1032, 1035 (5th Cir. 1971); Ramer v. United
States, 411 F.2d 30, 39-40 (9th Cir. 1969); Taylor v. United States, 222 F.2d 398, 402 (D.C.
Cir. 1955); see also PROPOSED FED. R. EvID. 504(d)(2), 56 F.R.D. at 244.
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. . [A]n exception [for a court-ordered examination] is necessary for the effective utilization of this important and growing procedure.

length one. .

The exception . . . deals with a court ordered examination rather than

with a court appointed psychotherapist. Also, the exception is effective
only with respect to the particular purpose for which the examination is
ordered. 129
In Ramer v. United States, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
amplified the Committee's view. 1 30 In Ramer, the defendant raised an
insanity defense to a charge of escape from confinement at a federal
penitentiary.' 3' The court ordered a psychotherapist to examine the defendant and to testify about this examination at trial.1 32 The Ninth Circuit held that an "[e]xamination for testimonial purposes only has
nothing to do with treatment. A doctor who makes such an examination is not 'attending a patient'. There is no confidential relation between them."' 3 3 The court concluded that because the doctor had
made a routine examination to ascertain the mental competence of the
defendant, the doctor had given no "treatment" to the patient; no privi1 34
lege, therefore, applied.
In United States v. Harper,the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
also stated that any psychotherapist-patient privilege does not protect
communications arising out of a court-ordered examination to determine whether the defendant is competent to stand trial.1 35 The court
declared that any privilege applies only to communications made to a
psychotherapist by a patient "under his charge or by one seeking profes36
sional advice."'
The third exception to the psychotherapist-patient privilege arises
129

56 F.R.D. at 244. The Committee also stated that

[t]he rule thus conforms with the provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 4244 that no statement made
by the accused in the course of an examination into competency to stand trial is admissible on the issue of guilt and of 42 U.S.C. § 3420 that a physician conducting an examination in a drug addiction commitment proceeding is a competent and compellable

witness.

Id. An examination by a "court appointed psychotherapist" constitutes an exception to the
privilege because the court appoints the psychotherapist solely to examine the individual for
the purpose of having the psychiatrist testify at trial about the condition of the patient, not to
help cure a mentally ill individual. See Taylor v. United States, 222 F.2d 398, 402 (D.C. Cir.
1955).
130

131

411 F.2d 30, 39-40 (9th Cir. 1969).
Id. at 31.

132 Id

133
134

Id at 39-40 (quoting Taylor v. United States, 222 F.2d 398, 402 (D.C. Cir. 1955)).
Id at 40.

135 450 F.2d 1032, 1035 (5th Cir. 1971). In Harper, the district court had convicted the
defendant for the unlawful manufacture of methadone. The district court had ordered two
psychotherapists to examine Harper after his arrest to determine his competency to stand
trial. On appeal, Harper claimed that the testimony of the two doctors was protected by the
psychotherapist-patient privilege. Id at 1034-35.
136 Id at 1035.
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when defendants raise their mental or emotional condition as an element of their defense. 137 Patients who voluntarily assert an insanity defense make their mental state the material issue of the proceedings. The
government should have an opportunity equal to that of the defendant
to present evidence relating to the issue of the defendant's mental condition. Prohibiting the government from obtaining communications that
are relevant to the main issue at trial, the mental or emotional state of
the defendant, would contravene the primary purpose of the Federal
Rules of Evidence: the complete development of all relevant facts in
138
litigation so that truth will be discovered.
For example, in United States v. Meagher, the defendant raised an
insanity defense to his indictment for a bank robbery. 3 9 The Fifth Circuit acknowledged that even if a psychotherapist-patient privilege existed under Rule 501, an express exception to the privilege applied to
"situations in which the patient relies upon his mental condition as an
element of his defense; i.e., whenever the defendant raises an insanity
defense."14
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Caesar v.Mountanos
also stated that patients implicitly waive their psychotherapist-patient
privilege when they bring their mental conditions into issue. 141 In Caesar,the court explained that
[t]he [party] has placed her mental and emotional condition in issue. By
raising this issue she herself has breached the confidential relationship and
made her emotional problems known to the public. Having so acted, the
patient and her psychiatrist should not now be permitted to rely upon an
absolute privilege which would preclude42a proper determination of the
truth of the [party]-patient's allegations.'
Courts, therefore, should follow the guidelines of Proposed Rule
504 in fashioning exceptions under Rule 501. These exceptions, when
combined with a balancing of all of the interests at stake in determining
the scope of the psychotherapist-patient privilege, allow courts to tailor
the privilege to each particular case. Such an approach will fulfill the
goal of Rule 501 that "recognition of a privilege based on a confidential
137 See, e.g., Caesar v. Mountanos, 542 F.2d 1064, 1070 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S.
954 (1977); United States v. Meagher, 531 F.2d 752, 753 (5th Cir. 1976). See also PROPOSED
FED R. EvID. 504(d)(3), 56 F.R.D. at 241, 244.
138 See FED. R. EvID. 102; PROPOSED FED. R. EvID. 504(d)(3) advisory committee note, 56
F.R.D. at 244; supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text. The Advisory Committee on the
Proposed Rules stated: "By injecting his condition into litigation, the patient must be said to
waive the privilege, in fairness and to avoid abuses." 56 F.R.D. at 244.
139 531 F.2d 752, 753 (5th Cir. 1976).
140 Id at 753.
141 542 F.2d 1064, 1069 (9th Cir. 1976).
142 Id. at 1070.
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relationship. . . should be determined on a case-by-case basis." 143 This
method of analysis for the psychotherapist-patient privilege also will fulfill the purposes of the Federal Rules of Evidence to discover all relevant
facts necessary for the trier of fact to ascertain truth in federal
litigation. 144
IV.

CONCLUSION

Federal Rule of Evidence 501 allows federal courts to establish a
psychotherapist-patient privilege under the principles of the common
law. The privilege promotes the psychotherapist-patient relationship
and fosters the successful treatment of mentally unstable individuals by
preserving the two foundations of the psychotherapist-patient relationship: the patient's trust in the psychotherapist, and the patient's confidence that no third parties will have access to communications and
diagnoses unless the patient intends the third parties to have such access.
By ensuring that communications arising from the psychotherapistpatient relationship will remain confidential, the privilege encourages
mentally ill persons to seek treatment and to cure their ills. Society also
benefits from the privilege because more of its members will seek treatment for mental problems; thus, these individuals will have a greater
chance to become mentally healthy and productive.
Courts must balance the benefits that accrue from the psychotherapist-patient privilege with a party's interest in developing all relevant
facts in litigation. Specific exceptions to the psychotherapist-patient
privilege limit the scope of the privilege: "intent"-waiver, court-ordered
examination, and the patient-defendant who raises a mental or emotional state as an issue of the patient's defense. For each case, courts
must allow disclosure only of material information that is necessary for
discovery of all evidence relevant to the criminal proceeding to minimize the harm to the patient and to the psychotherapist-patient
relationship.
The Supreme Court should settle the debate over the existence of
the privilege and define the general scope of the psychotherapist-patient
privilege as a guide for analyzing the privilege under Rule 501. The
Court should decisively affirm the position of several federal courts, state
legislatures, commentators, and the Judicial Conference Advisory Committee to the Federal Rules of Evidence that the unique nature of the
143 S. REP. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1974). See supra text accompanying note 32.
144

See FED. R. EvID. 102; supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text.
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psychotherapist-patient relationship mandates a psychotherapist-patient
privilege under Federal Rule of Evidence 501.
H.
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